Several recent papers examine how asset prices respond to the surprise component in macroeconomic news. An emerging puzzle is that equity markets respond di¤erently to nonmonetary policy news depending on whether the economy is in a recession or an expansion.
Good macroeconomic news tends to depress equity returns during expansions while markets respond favorably to positive surprises during recessions (McQueen and Roley 1993; Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan 2005; Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega 2005) . In aggregate, the coe¢cient on positive news surprises is therefore often found to be small although occasionally signi…cant (Rigobon and Sack 2006) . One theory is that this asymmetric response is because good news during an expansion primarily conveys information about the future of the risk-free rate.
I test this hypothesis by assessing the response of equity returns to macroeconomic news after controlling for changes in the market's expectation of future Federal Reserve policy. I incorporate a market-based measure of changes in expectations of the future riskfree rate in a standard event study framework to examine the e¤ect of seven major news announcements on returns. Using real-time measures of the news surprises, I …rst assess how market expectations of the future Federal Funds rate change as a result of each of the surprises. I then assess how returns respond to each kind of surprise using changes in the expected Fed Funds rate as a control variable.
I …nd no evidence that changes in market expectations of future monetary policy explain the weak response of equity markets to good news about real activity. The results contrast with the conclusions drawn by Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan (2005) . Based on the reaction of bond prices to news, Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan suggest that the negative reaction of the stock market to positive employment news during expansions results from changes in expectations of the risk-free rate. However, bond yields are not in general weighted averages of expected future short-rates (see, for example, Diebold, Rudebusch, and Arouba 2006) as predicted by the expectations hypothesis. It is therefore necessary to directly assess the e¤ect of news on expected future short-rates. Section 1 discusses the di¤erent channels through which macroeconomic surprises may a¤ect returns. Section 2 assesses the e¤ect of news surprises on expectations of future monetary policy. Section 3 examines the e¤ect of news on equity and bond returns after controlling for the e¤ect of the news on expectations of future monetary policy.
Theoretical Framework
As is well-known, U.S. monetary policy is well approximated by a foreward-looking Taylor rule. That is, the Federal Reserve responds to increases in expected output or expected in ‡ation above trend by increasing the Fed Funds rate. Letting R F t be the Fed Funds rate, t and Y t be some measures of in ‡ation and real activity at date t with and Y their steady-state levels, the market expectation for R F t+j can be described by
Suppose information relevant to either E t t+j or E t Y t+j arrives at date 2 (t; t + j). It immediately follows that
Macroeconomic news surprises that contain information about either t+j or Y t+j will thus raise market expectations for the future risk-free rate.
I consider two broad classes of indicators: indicators with information primarily about the real side of the economy (i.e., information relevant to expectations of Y t+j ) and those with information about the nominal side of the economy (i.e., information relevant to expectations of t+j ). As a result of the information structure above, each indicator will in general contain information about two or more of factors that a¤ect equity returns. Good news about the real side of the economy implies higher future risk-free rates and higher cash ‡ows. According to general equilibrium asset pricing models where the price of an asset is the sum of its expected future discounted dividends, good news about future cash ‡ows should increase equity returns. The cash ‡ow and Fed Funds channel thus work in opposite direction for all broad measures of real U.S. economic activity.
News about the nominal side of the economy includes information about both future in ‡ation and future monetary policy. Higher than expected in ‡ation should decrease equity returns as a result of the increase in the expected risk-free rate. Furthermore, several explanations for the negative correlation between in ‡ation and stock returns do not center on the link between in ‡ation and monetary policy. See Goto and Valkanov (2002) or Ritter and Warr (2002) for reviews of this literature.
The E¤ect of News on Monetary Policy Expectations
Market e¢ciency implies that markets should only react to the unanticipated component in macroeconomic news announcements; by the time of the news release, prices already incorporate the anticipated component of the news. The right measure of news is thus the deviation of the indicator from the market's consensus forecast for it.
I normalize the surprise component of each news announcement by dividing by the standard deviation of the news surprise in the sample as in Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) and Vega (2003, 2005) . That is, for each indicator k, the surprise is given by
where A k;t is the actual real-time value of indicator k announced at date t, E k;t is the consensus forecast for the indicator, and^ k is the sample standard deviation of A k;t E k;t . The negative of the unemployment surprise is used such that a decrease in the unemployment rate is recorded as a positive news surprise.
The group of indicators that primarily contain information about the real side of the economy includes the Unemployment Rate, New Home Sales, Advance GDP, Consumer
Con…dence, and Capacity Utilization. The second group consists of core CPI and core PPI.
I follow Kuttner (2001) ahead, the change between date t and t 1 in the market's expectation for the risk-free rate m full months ahead is
The e¤ect of the surprise on the market's expectation of the Fed Funds rate m months ahead is then estimated for indicator k using With the exception of Advance GDP, all the regressions have the expected signs and are signi…cant at almost all horizons with the greatest e¤ects being seen in the 6 month ahead contracts. The signs on Advance GDP are always positive but never signi…cant. The lack of signi…cance is likely due to the small sample size since it is the only indicator sampled at the quarterly rather than monthly frequency.
The E¤ect of News on Returns
The data consist of four stock indices: the Dow Jones Composite Average, the NASDAQ Composite, the NYSE Composite, and the S&P 500 Composite. I assess the e¤ect of news surprises on government T-bill and bonds using 90-day, six-month, one year, …ve-year, and ten-year yields.
I estimate
and
For equities, R t = I compare the estimates from (3:1) and (3:2) with the results from estimating Table 2 shows the results of estimating equations (3:2) and (3:3) for equity markets; the results from estimating equation (3:1) were quite similar to those from (3:2). and are substantively the same for all seven indicators. There is thus no evidence to support the notion that equity markets' response to macroeconomic news is mediated through changes in monetary policy expectations.
The only news that consistently has signi…cant e¤ects is core CPI news. This is consistent with the results of Rigobon and Sack (2006) . However, the evidence here rules out the possibility that equity markets respond badly to in ‡ation surprises simply because they imply higher future interest rates.
It is tempting to think that this result is an artifact of illiquidity in the Fed Funds 
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